


# The European Security and Defence Union

SPECIAL TOPIC  
EU and Russia



## Europe is a strategic partner in the Transatlantic Security Region



**Russia is a partner  
for peace**  
H. E. Ambassador Vladimir Chizhov,  
Permanent Representative of the  
Russian Federation to the EU, Brussels



**Cyprus' role as  
a mentor**  
Dr Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis,  
Foreign Minister of Cyprus,  
Nicosia

[www.magazine-the-european.com](http://www.magazine-the-european.com)



# Reinforce your strengths.


**You'll have room to manoeuvre with HP as your ally.**

With the expertise of the world's largest technology company to draw on, you'll be excellently equipped to confront all of your challenges. You can trust in the latest technologies and services to strengthen your deployment capability and mobility. Rely on our tailored solutions and the long-term experience our specialist teams bring to the table to meet all of your practical requirements – with meticulous, military precision.

More information:  
[www.hp.com/go/defense](http://www.hp.com/go/defense)







# The Nobel Prize for the European Union (EU) and national interests

The award of the Nobel Peace Prize to the European Union shows well-deserved recognition of the EU's efforts to achieve peace and unification. But it is also a call to the continent to continue its peaceful development and to unrelentingly pursue its search for an identity and a common purpose, for this is the only way to carve out a place for itself in a world of global competition.

For me, somehow, this prize has to do in particular with Germany, which was at the origin of two world wars, and with the efforts of the surrounding nations to ensure its re-integration after the Second World War. For decades now it has been a strong democracy with a widely envied economic model and stable state institutions. The Germans owe that achievement to a handful of great politicians, notably Robert Schuman, Alcide de Gasperi and Winston Churchill, who were sufficiently farsighted to realise that humiliation was not the way to establish peace and harmony in Europe and that the construction of a united Europe was not possible without, at its heart, a democratic Germany as a partner in the peace process. Schuman's vision was one not of subjection but above all, of equal partnership.

Conscious of its historical responsibility, which was already recognised by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, Germany has never striven to play the leading role in Europe. Whenever it was necessary to forge ahead with Europe's development and the process of integration, this was always done in cooperation with Germany's close allies, above all France. Should France no longer be a partner, it would leave a vacuum. Paris would do well to consider this.

Although some European states are calling for Germany to take the lead, Berlin's stance in the financial crisis has also awakened fears in Europe that it could let itself be too strongly

guided by national interests. It is worth noting that similar fears were sparked by the failure of the merger between EADS and British Aerospace last month. And indeed it is true that the three EU countries France, the UK and Germany have missed a major opportunity here, not only for the European economy but also for Europe as a whole.

The man behind that initiative, Dr Thomas Enders, CEO, EADS, is a German industry chief of the new generation: a convinced European with an international vision who was already actively involved in the creation of EADS. And yet petty national interests and a lack of economic and political foresight have led to that wasted opportunity for Europe.

Europe's security and defence industries are at a crossroads. The Brussels Commission has recognised this. What Europe needs to move forward are great industry chiefs of the ilk of Tom Enders, with a European vision, the ability to identify challenges to Europe and the readiness to take action in order to establish an enduringly viable European economy and industry in the face of competition from China, the US and certainly also India in the future.

But all those efforts would be futile without a new generation of politicians with the farsightedness and creative energy of a Schuman or de Gasperi, capable of taking decisions in the common European interest.



Hartmut Bühl

Hartmut Bühl, Editor-in-Chief

## Impressum

The European – Security and Defence Union  
ProPress Publishing Group Bonn/Berlin

### Headquarters Berlin:

Kaskelstr. 41, D-10317 Berlin  
Phone: +49/30/557 412-0, Fax: +49/30/557 412-33

### Brussels Office:

Hartmut Bühl  
Avenue des Celtes, 30, B-1040 Brussels  
Phone/Fax: +32/2732 3135, GMS: 0049/1723 282 319  
E-Mail: hartmut.buehl@orange.fr ; Hartmut.buehl@euro-defence.eu

### Bonn Office:

Am Buschhof 8, D-53227 Bonn  
Phone: +49/228/970 97-0, Fax: +49/228/970 97-75

### Advertisement Office Bonn:

Karin Dornbusch  
Phone: +49/228/970 97-40  
E-Mail: Karin.dornbusch@euro-defence.eu

Publisher and Editor-in-Chief: Hartmut Bühl, Brussels  
Deputy Editor-in-Chief: Nannette Cazaubon, Paris; E-Mail: nannette.b@gmx.net  
Publishing House: ProPress Verlagsgesellschaft mbH

President ProPress Publishing Group: R. Uwe Proll  
Layout: SpreeService- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH, Berlin  
Print: Heider Druck GmbH, Bergisch Gladbach

The European – Security and Defence Union Magazine is published by the ProPress Publishing Group. The ProPress Publishing Group is the organizer of the congress on European Security and Defence (Berlin Security Conference), the European Police Congress and the European Congress on Disaster Management.

For further information about the magazine and the congresses please visit [www.magazine-the-european.com](http://www.magazine-the-european.com)

Suscription: This magazine is published in Brussels and Berlin.

The copy price is 16 Euro: 3 copies for one year: 42 Euro (EU subscription)  
3 copies for one year: 66 Euro (international subscription)  
including postage and dispatch (3 issues)

© 2012 by ProPress Publishing Group Bonn/Berlin

ProPress Publishing Group is the holding of the trade mark BEHOERDEN SPIEGEL.



**Elmar Brok MEP**  
Chairman Foreign Affairs Committee, European Parliament, Strasbourg/Brussels



**Claude France Arnould**  
CEO, European Defence Agency, Brussels

## POLICY and POLITICS

### 3 Editorial

- 6 *Dr Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis, Nikosia*  
**A stable Mediterranean Region is a prerequisite for Europe's welfare**  
Striving for peace

- 7 *Dirk Brengelmann, Brussels*  
**NATO after Chicago – implementing the Strategic Concept**  
Turning political decisions into reality

- 9 *Elmar Brok MEP, Strasbourg/Brussels*  
**The EEAS – a critical review**  
For more strategic and political consistency

### SPECIAL TOPIC

## The European Union, Russia and NATO

- 11 *Oliver Bruzek, Warsaw*  
**From confrontation to realistic cooperation**  
Dialog and confidence building
- 12 *Vladimir Chizhov, Brussels*  
**Time to enhance the security and economic pillars**  
Russia's contribution is decisive for peace
- 14 *Hannes Swoboda MEP, Strasbourg/Brussels*  
**Objectives of the EU's Russia policy**  
The EU needs a partnership for stability
- 16 *Dr Klaus Olshausen, Meckenheim*  
**The NATO-Russia Council and the Missile Defence project**  
How to create mutual confidence
- 18 *Vladimir M. Grinin, Berlin*  
**Missile defence – is a political decision feasible?**  
Russian interests are not respected

## The Common Security and Defence Policy

- 21 *Arnaud Danjean MEP, Strasbourg/Brussels*  
**The Lisbon Comprehensive Approach and the consequences for the CSDP**  
Declining ability through shrinking budgets
- 24 *Claude-France Arnould, Brussels*  
**The European Defence Agency – taking stock**  
The main objective is to deliver capabilities
- 27 *Denis Verret, Paris*  
**The failed merger between EADS and British Aerospace (BAE)**  
Putting a stop to national ambiguities once and for all
- 28 *Thomas Homberg, Schrobenhausen*  
**Plea for a common European industry strategy**  
The EU must focus on developing its own capabilities
- 31 *Jacques Favin-Lévêque, Versailles*  
**Lancaster House – against the spirit of European integration?**  
No great outcome
- 32 **Conferences report**
- 34 *Reinhard Bütikofer MEP, Strasbourg/Brussels*  
**Last exit cooperation – is Europe missing out on the pooling and sharing project?**  
Alternative approaches for a new concept
- 36 *Jean-Paul Perruche, Paris*  
**No Europe without defence, no defence without Europe!**  
Defence capabilities – a dangerous decline
- 39 *Christina Balis, Washington/Paris*  
**Transatlantic defence cooperation**  
Leaderless Europe



**Hannes Swoboda MEP**

Leader of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, European Parliament, Brussels/Strasbourg



**Håkan Buskhe**

President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Saab AB, Stockholm

---

## SECURITY and SECURITY SOLUTIONS EU/NATO

---

**40** *Stefano Manservigi, Brussels*

**The development of the Schengen area**

Progress in terms of mindset and capabilities

**42** *Klaus-Peter Treche, Brussels*

**AFCEA Europe – the organisation to head industry's contribution to user requirements**

Support industries by showing what line to take

**47** *Stefan Pauwels, Leuven*

**High performance visualisation for command and control superiority**

Creating a new quality of situational awareness

### Crisis Management

**50** *Håkan Buskhe, Stockholm*

**Air power for forces protection**

The right mix of aircraft and UAS

**53** *Lutz Kampmann, Kreuzlingen*

**A post-Afghanistan strategy for armoured vehicles**

Meeting military requirements through modularity

**55** *Horst Schuchmann, Bremen*

**"Bespoke Suit" made from steel**

Individual container solutions

**56** *Andreas Beer, Flensburg*

**FFG's new PMMC G5**

Using the progress of high technology

### Maritime Security

**57** *Dr Charles Tannock MEP*

**An EU Strategy for the Horn of Africa**

Europe has a role to play

**59** *Dorothee Frank, Meckenheim*

**A new corvette for multiple types of engagement**

New mission capabilities

**60** *Rainer Jentzsch, Stuttgart*

**I-MAST: a revolution in naval vessel construction**

Excellent communications are pivotal

**62** *Sven and Richard Boger, Aulendorf*

**Closing the gap of unexploited reconnaissance capabilities**

Future of COMINT and SIGINT in a naval environment

---

*"The European – Security and Defence Union" is the winner of the 2011 European Award for Citizenship, Security and Defence*



A view from Cyprus

# A stable Mediterranean Region is a prerequisite for Europe's welfare

by Dr Erato Kazakou-Marcoullis\*, Foreign Minister of Cyprus, Nikosia

As European Union membership broadened, so have its borders become longer and geographically varied. With the inclusion of Cyprus in 2004 the EU has effectively come to share a sea border with all countries of the Mediterranean. This development, coupled with recent upheavals in North Africa and the Middle East, has come to mean that the significance of the 'Southern Neighbourhood,' has now taken on additional importance for Europe. Indeed, it is no longer possible to contemplate a prosperous and stable Europe without similar conditions in the countries of the Mediterranean.

## A strategy for stability

The only way that Europe can contribute to improving the situation is by following a three pronged strategy which includes economic engagement, reinforcing legal frameworks of cooperation, and remaining vigilant and steadfast in its values. The EU has been economically engaged in the countries of the Mediterranean for years. However the challenges faced by many countries of the 'Arab Spring' are not simply economic, but a combination of factors including an explosive demography, tensions within the social and ethnic fabric, extreme climate change, and an underdeveloped system of political inclusion. This requires sophisticated and innovative engagement combining economic, developmental and educational tools. The recent meeting in Cairo of the EU-Egypt task force is an example of the sort of economic engagement needed.

## Legal framework is a precondition

However, economic and development initiatives can only bear fruit if there are the necessary legal frameworks to sustain them. These can only come about through a broad network of agreements which comply with both the EU aqis and with international law. A case in point is the Cypriot approach to managing the natural wealth in our Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). It is obvious to us that in an area of such high tensions, the only way to move forward and benefit from the wealth in our seas is through respect of our neighbours and of international law. We therefore moved toward the establishment of a series of bilateral agreements which delineate the borders of our EEZ with our neighbours. We did so in line with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and in complete cooperation with our neighbours: Egypt, in 2002, Lebanon, in 2007, and Israel in 2010. We are now in the process of refining existing agreements, defining future cooperation, and by

extension, creating the necessary stability in an area not famous for calm.

## Faithful cooperation

We believe that honest, negotiated and joint collaboration is the only way to move forward in what is essentially a shared space - shared by the EU European Union and its Southern Neighbours. If the enormous investments necessary will be made available to exploit the natural wealth in the Eastern Mediterranean - all sides must benefit. The ultimate result will come in the form of more jobs, greater prosperity, and development. This process which we have already begun in the Eastern Mediterranean must be expanded throughout the broader Mediterranean. It may prove, if applied in good faith and with a shared future as our goal, to be an important tool in furthering stability and prosperity. Nonetheless, the situation in the foreseeable future also requires that the EU remain vigilant and take a pro-active role in securing the Mediterranean and its borders. This does not imply draconian measures, or even that stability can only be ensured through military or police means; nonetheless, these cannot be disregarded.

## Shared values

The EU is based on a set of shared values which emphasize freedoms – of the individual, of society, of economy. However, they also require adherence to a set of rules which protect these freedoms. One of the problems now facing Europe in its southern neighbourhood is that these European values are either rejected outright or are in the process of being challenged. On the other hand, this does not mean that Europe has ceased to be an attractive destination for those who do not share the European set of values. So, what is to be done? Clearly, Europe cannot remain apathetic. It must remain steadfast in the essential good of its values of freedoms, continue to believe that these are freedoms that all humans aspire toward, but also remain vigilant in the protection of these values. Europe must be willing take the lead in efforts to stabilize the southern neighbourhood, and show a determined presence in times of crisis. No less important is the willingness of Europe to show solidarity to its member states that have physical borders in the Mediterranean.

\*Dr Kozakou-Marcoullis assumed office as Minister of Foreign Affairs on 5 August 2011. She had served as Minister of Communications and Works since 2 March 2010, Ambassador to the United States of America from 1998 to 2003.



NATO is shaping its future

# NATO after Chicago – implementing the Strategic Concept

by Dirk Brengelmann, Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy, NATO, Brussels

Earlier this year, NATO held its largest Summit meeting ever. Over 60 nations and international organisations gathered in Chicago and took significant decisions that will shape the continuing evolution of the Alliance, our operations, and our relationship with our partners.

## The main priorities for NATO

Six months on from this important Summit, the focus is now on turning those political decisions into reality. Although work is progressing on many different tracks, three key priorities stand out:

### Afghanistan

Our mission there remains NATO's single most important operational priority. Together with our 22 partner countries in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), we want to help Afghanistan to stand on its own feet; to become a nation that is secure and stable; and to be a country that will never again be a base for terrorists to launch attacks against us. The most effective way to do this is to help the Afghan authorities to take responsibility for security in their own country. Very significant progress has already been achieved. We are steadily handing over security responsibility to the Afghans across the whole of the country. At the same time, we are helping the Afghans to develop and improve their own capabilities.

Our timeline is to complete this transition by the end of 2014 – a date set two years ago at the suggestion of President Karzai. Already, nearly 352,000 Afghan National Security Forces – both Army and Police – have been trained. And more than 75% of the Afghan population is now protected and secured by Afghan forces. Next year, the whole of the country will come under lead Afghan security responsibility. And by the end of 2014, the whole of the country will be under full Afghan security responsibility. At this time, NATO's combat role will come to an end – but NATO's commitment to Afghanistan will endure. The Chicago Summit sent a clear message in this regard: while NATO will end its combat mission at the end of 2014, we will not abandon Afghanistan or the Afghan people. In October, NATO Defence Ministers approved the framework for a NATO-led mission to provide training, advice and assistance to the Afghan Security Forces beyond 2014. The Taliban should be under no illusion that they can simply wait us out. However, security is only one part of the problem, and NATO is



### Dirk Brengelmann

Ambassador Dirk Brengelmann has been NATO's Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy since the beginning of 2010. He entered the German Foreign Service in 1984. He served as the Private Secretary of Jürgen Möllemann, Minister of State at the Federal Foreign Office, and subsequently served as

Political Counselor at the German Embassy in London, Deputy European Correspondent in the Federal Foreign Office, and Political Counselor at the German Embassy in Washington DC. From 2000 to 2003, he served as Deputy Director in the Private Office of NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson. After serving as Director and Head of the Defence and Security Policy Division at the Federal Foreign Office, he returned to Brussels in 2008 as Minister Plenipotentiary in the German Delegation to NATO, before taking up his current post.

only one part of the solution. Afghanistan's leaders have to shoulder their responsibility for the country's future. They have to move in the right direction in building a functioning, prosperous state that can maintain the support of the Afghan people. They have pledged to do so – with the coordinated help of the international community – and it is now vital that all these pledges be fulfilled.

### Capabilities

The second key priority area of work within the Alliance is ensuring that NATO has the right capabilities to carry out our three core roles – collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security – set down in the new Strategic Concept two years ago.

The current economic climate has made it more difficult to acquire and deploy these capabilities. When government expenditure is under pressure across many fronts in many Allied nations, defence budgets cannot always be exempt from reductions. However, in today's unpredictable world, security cannot be put on the backburner. We must prevent that underinvestment in our defence capabilities means that today's economic crisis becomes tomorrow's security crisis.

At Chicago, we acknowledged these challenges, and we agreed a way to overcome them. We set ourselves the goal of "NATO Forces 2020" – forces that are well equipped, well



Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Heads of State and Government on May 21<sup>st</sup> in Chicago.

Photo: Thorsten Bohlmann /NATO

trained, and able to operate effectively with Allies as well as with partners.

As a way to achieve this goal, we agreed on “Smart Defence”. This new guiding principle for capability development is all about greater prioritisation, specialisation and, most importantly, multinational cooperation.

Since Chicago, we are already moving ahead with over twenty multinational projects under the Smart Defence banner. These cover a wide array of capabilities, from countering Improvised Explosive Devices to sharing smart munitions. And many more projects are coming through the pipeline.

Another important feature of Smart Defence is that it is a truly transatlantic effort. Europeans are involved in all current projects; they are leading two thirds of them; and one third of the projects are purely European in terms of participation. By cooperating more in this manner, European Allies reinforce each other, reinforce Europe, and reinforce NATO.

One of the most high profile multinational capability projects is Missile Defence. In many ways, this is Smart Defence at its best. Four countries – Poland, Romania, Turkey, and Spain – have agreed to host United States’ missile defence assets; and all 28 Allies have agreed to invest over 1 billion dollars in the command and control and communications infrastructure needed to support the NATO ballistic missile defence system. We still hope to reach agreement with Russia over how we can work together on this vital capability. Just like NATO, Russia also faces a growing threat from missile proliferation, and it makes sense for us to work together in addressing that threat.

### Partnership

NATO’s partnerships over the past two decades have been a real success story. While the focus was initially on Central and Eastern Europe, the Alliance now has partners on all five continents, engaging with us in a variety of ways. For all our partners, political consultations are the priority. But many also choose to make extremely valuable contributions in other

fields, such as participating in our operations, or providing political and financial support to our operations.

Here in Europe, we have several partners who aspire to join the Alliance. These nations know that NATO’s door remains open to them, but they also know that they need to continue and complete various reforms before they will be ready to assume the obligations and responsibilities of membership. NATO will continue to help those countries, because we want to see the day when Europe is finally whole and free. But, ultimately reforms can only be done by the countries themselves.

Partnerships are also vital to our security interests in Europe’s neighbourhood. This time last year, NATO was concluding its historic operation to protect the people of Libya. That successful operation showed that our security is linked with that of the countries across North Africa, the Middle East and the Gulf region, and it has sparked greater interest in working together to deal with other common challenges, such as terrorism, maritime security, proliferation, and security sector reform. Transition throughout that region will be a long process. At the Chicago Summit, NATO offered its support to those countries in transition that would like our help. The Alliance has unrivalled expertise in this area from helping to transform the countries of Central and Eastern Europe following the end of the Cold War. If requested, we can bring this expertise to bear to assist countries of the Middle East and North Africa region in their chosen path of transition.

### The way ahead

The Chicago Summit was an important milestone in translating the new Strategic Concept into reality – but more work lies ahead in Afghanistan, on our defence capabilities, and in our engagement with partners. Six months on from Chicago, the Alliance is moving forward on all these fronts, to ensure the collective defence of our members; to undertake effective crisis management; and to engage in cooperative security with partners across the globe.





The EU is committed to achieving a more democratic and effective European foreign policy

## The EEAS – a critical review

Interview with Elmar Brok MEP, Chairman AFET Committee, European Parliament, Strasbourg/Brussels

**The European:** Mr Brok, you are back in the Chair of the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee. From the outset you have been highly committed to making the European External Action Service (EEAS) an instrument for providing powerful added value to the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and to ensuring influence and scrutiny on the part of the European Parliament. Are you satisfied with the results of the EEAS so far?

**Elmar Brok:** The EEAS is still in the process of developing its full capacities. It is a huge step forward for European foreign policy as it finally embodies the concept of the one voice policy within an institution. However, we need to be patient. To build up a foreign service is a huge task. We in the European institutions, as well as the officials in the member state institutions, must adapt and learn how to use this new service most efficiently. This will take some time.

**The European:** Generally speaking, then, you recognise the role of this service in giving the European institutions and nations the chance to deliver a single EU message on key political issues. You underlined this in your report voted by the EP in September. Could you elaborate?

**Elmar Brok:** The main message of my report was to signal to the citizens of Europe that the EU is committed to achieving a more democratic and effective European foreign policy that puts their interests at its core: i.e. the promotion of security, economic prosperity and democracy starting in our neighbourhood and in our broader external relations. In doing this I believe it confirms the argument that for the EU's external action to be coherent, effective and give value for money it must be better coordinated and clear strategic priorities starting with our commitment to the Neighbourhood have to be identified. I offered our full support for the High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP) to show leadership in representing the security and economic interests of the Union by addressing serious challenges in particular in the negotiations with Iran, in responding to the Arab Spring and in working to stop the bloodshed in Syria as well as in upholding democracy in our Neighbourhood.

**The European:** Let me focus on three of the points you made in the report, starting with the "appropriate mechanism" that you wish to see created. What do you aim to achieve and what line should be taken?

**Elmar Brok:** We need to find appropriate mechanisms in order to have an efficient and smart cooperation and division of

### Elmar Brok MEP

Elmar Brok MEP has been Chairman of the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee since 2011. He is also a member of the Conference of Committee Chairs and of the Delegation for relations with the People's Republic of China. He was born 1946, studied law and politics in Germany and then worked as a radio journalist and newspaper correspondent. He was elected Member of the European Parliament in 1980. He was the Parliament representative at the Intergovernmental Conferences on the Amsterdam Treaty (1996/1997), the Nice Treaty (2000), the Lisbon Treaty (2007) and the EU Constitution (2003/2004), as well as in the Council's Reflection Group for Maastricht II (1994/1995).

tasks between the different European institutions and also between the EU institutions and their counterparts at Member State level.

**The European:** That brings me directly to my next point: synergies. What needs to be done in order to achieve synergies in implementing the EEAS? How do you see this issue developing?

**Elmar Brok:** There are a vast number of potential synergies that we must exploit to the fullest possible extent, especially at a time in which debt reduction is called for. There are synergies on all levels, for instance between the EEAS and the Commission's country desks, the member states' foreign services, Parliamentary country desks etc.

This is a difficult process, as the exploitation of synergies is sometimes perceived to be bad for some employees, if they had to move their desks to the EEAS, for instance. However on the member state level we are already seeing a major step forward. Some smaller member states have decided to close down some of their foreign representations and the EU representation will start to provide consular services for these countries. Imagine the effect for the EU's outward representation; this is fantastic!

**The European:** Indeed, and what perspectives for other members! My third point: the monitoring of the gender balance within the EEAS staff itself and the posting of national diplomats to senior responsibilities in the capitals. Are nations ready to recruit "EU driven" diplomats and do nations accept the HR/VP exerting influence on these personalities? Or do nations try to make them work in favour of national interests?

**Elmar Brok:** We have always had and will continue to have for a long time to come this difficult balance between national and EU interests. It is clear that this is not something that will

be resolved in a short time. The HR/VP is doing a good job in giving European foreign policy a face and a voice. Understandably the British, or French, or Polish or German foreign ministers will also speak out for their countries, but the coordination between all national interests can be greatly facilitated by the EEAS and its representative. In the long run, the HR/VP will be the voice of the European Union; no-one is to blame for the fact that it will take time to build this capacity and the networks needed to fill this role.

***The European:** Turning to the issue of security and defence: in your report you criticise the fact that the HR/VP has not started the process that will lead to Council conclusions on Permanent Structured Cooperation in the field of the CSDP and that there is a lack of guidelines for the systematic use of coalitions.*

**Elmar Brok:** We initially focused on the task of setting up the EEAS, but we also need to develop the important Lisbon Treaty provisions on European defence. In my report I want to start this debate by calling for guidelines for drawing on the defence expertise of “core groups” of Member States as well as to launch a process that will lead to European Council discussions on defence. In fact I am pleased that this idea is being taken up by the President of the European Council, Mr van Rompuy, who will be organising a European Council debate on defence in the second half of next year.

***The European:** In a recent draft report on the implementation of the CSDP, SEDE Chairman Arnaud Danjean called for a European White Paper on Security and Defence that should precisely define the EU's strategic interests and take account of changing threats and the development of relations with the EU's allies and partners, but also with emerging countries. The 2003 European Security Strategy does indeed look outdated. Is there a chance that we will see the birth of such a White Paper soon?*

**Elmar Brok:** It is important that we do not confuse two very important but separate issues. On the one hand we have had calls, including from the European Parliament, for a revision or update of the 2003 European Security Strategy. Others call for the same thing but give it another name; for instance, I had a discussion on this topic recently in AFET with Mr Bildt, who referred to the need for a “European Global Strategy”.

In addition, in my Annual Report I call for a more focused and operational discussion to bring to life the Lisbon Treaty provisions on European defence. Both a European Council-level discussion on European defence and Mr Danjean's call for a White Paper would help this more focused discussion. I believe both approaches are complementary, on the one hand reflecting upon the fast-changing strategic environment while, on the other, looking at what capabilities and resources we need in order to deliver peace and economic prosperity for the citizens of Europe.

***The European:** I follow you. Let me descend to the level below, that of crisis-management forces. From the very beginning the limits of the concept of EU forces were evident, but battle-groups, for example, were for long time a “prestige issue” for the Parliament. At the very latest with the comprehensive approach of the Lisbon Treaty was it not clear that the purely military battlegroup concept had become outdated?*

**Elmar Brok:** The European Parliament has always called for developing both a civilian capacity as well as a defence capacity for responding to conflicts and helping to promote peace and security in our neighbourhood and further afield. We know that there is never a military-only solution to complex conflicts. Ever since we started to develop an EU CFSP we have looked at developing both the diplomatic means for conflict prevention and at the same time the civilian and military capabilities needed to stop conflicts escalating or to accompany peace processes. But let me be clear, the task of developing civilian capabilities is more about creating something new in the form of new EUSRs, the EEAS, or Civilian Response Teams, whereas in the area of defence we have to re-design a system, where 2 million men and women and € 200 billion per year must be re-organised to meet the security needs of Europe's citizens. We can create a new EUSR such as for the Horn of Africa in a few months, but it takes much investment and many years to make sure we have the ships, planes, logistic capabilities and specialised troops to tackle piracy and bring stability to that region.

***The European:** What is still missing is a civilian-military planning capability with a long-term perspective incorporating the human and financial resources needed for crisis prevention and post-conflict peace and nation building. There still seems to be a lack of common sense on this point both within the EU institutions and the nations. What is the way forward in your view?*

**Elmar Brok:** The EU has come a long way over the last ten years in bringing together civilian and military experts for crisis management and peace-building. We have reinforced our planning and decision-making capacity. Now for the first time we have activated an Operations Centre to coordinate the civilian and military missions for the Horn of Africa. I look forward to monitoring how this Operations Centre brings new added value to the coordination of CSDP missions alongside the political coordination under the EUSR and the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa. If the Operations Centre is successful it will give strong arguments to those who think our capacities could be further reinforced with a permanent Operational Headquarters that brings all our civilian and military expertise together. As Chair of AFET I will be closely following this issue and preparing for the bigger debate on European defence that should take place in 2013.

***The European:** Mr Brok, thank you for the interview.*



SPECIAL TOPIC

# The European Union, Russia and NATO

The cold war ended 20 years ago and confrontational rhetoric is no longer the way to achieve progress in the Transatlantic Security and Economic Region. The time has now come for Europe, NATO and Russia to develop their relations for the coming decades. Only through a persistent dialogue at all levels and in all sectors of interest can confidence be built.

Photo: Bernd Rossau, CC BY 2.0, Flickr

Change through rapprochement

## From confrontation to realistic cooperation

by Oliver Bruzek\*, General Manager, Vice Versa Central Eastern Consultancy Group, Warsaw

Future relations with Russia must be defined on the basis of the EU's conception of itself and of a realistic assessment of its geopolitical role. It is therefore helpful to start by considering the transatlantic relationship. These days, there is concern and suspicion in Europe about what is perceived as an increasing tendency on the part of the United States to turn away from Europe and towards the Pacific region. It is implied that Europe is losing its strategic importance in the eyes of the US and hence globally. But this is to disregard that:

It there is no partner able in the foreseeable future to take Europe's place alongside the United States with anywhere near the same level of strategic relevance. This has to do not just with their many shared values, but also with a whole host of other factors, ranging from Europe's role as a logistic hub for the United States' global missions to the numbers of European military units deployed on operations under US leadership or alongside American troops.

### Europe's strategic relevance for the US

It is precisely because the US has such a reliable partner in Europe that it is able to broaden its strategic horizon and seek new partnerships. This is a policy that has become possible in the changed world order and the US Administration would be foolish not to pursue it, for it is quite simply in the national interest.

Europe must also define and exploit its geopolitical room for manoeuvre. Indeed this is a process that already began with the EU's eastwards enlargement. As a result, Russia has not only become the EU's direct neighbour, but in many respects also its most important one. There is much discussion of the economic implications of that proximity and the interdependence it entails, but – although this may sound old-fashioned in

an era of global asymmetric threats – an essential point as regards the geostrategic and security environment is being overlooked: alongside the US Russia is the only country to possess a nuclear second strike capability. A renewed awareness of that fact has consequences when it comes to shaping the future relations with Russia.

### The way ahead is stony, but promising

1. The European Union must understand the necessity of stronger military and also armaments cooperation: confidence-building through cooperation with the long-term objective of disarmament. The shift in the US doctrine under President Obama – from confrontation to cooperation – may be conducive to that approach.
2. It is necessary to build effective crisis-communication instruments. These are in the EU's own interest, in particular with a view to the unresolved conflicts in its immediate neighbourhood.
3. There has to be a realistic perception of the possibilities for exerting influence on the Russian Government on internal political issues: the changes that are quite rightly called for in terms of respect for the rules of democracy, freedom of the press and of opinion and more generally speaking, human rights (to which Russia is also committed within the Council of Europe) must no longer be made a condition for establishing certain relations, but should rather be achieved on the road towards partnership. We need to give fresh thought to the concept of "change through rapprochement".

\*Oliver Bruzek advises on political matters and supports clients in Central and Eastern Europe. He has set up a strategic group composed of German and Polish Politicians, Experts and Decision-Makers in the field of Security and Defence Policy.

The Russia-EU Strategic Partnership

# Time to enhance the security and economic pillars

by Vladimir Chizhov, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the EU, Brussels

Furthering the relationship with the European Union and incrementally progressing towards a common space of economic interaction, human contacts and regional security remains at the heart of Russia's foreign policy. Our unwavering belief in the vitality of European integration as well as the EU's ability to overcome the ongoing financial and economic calamities is best manifested by sheer numbers. Russia remains the EU's third largest trade partner with steep rates of growth, having attained a total trade volume of 307 billion euros in 2011. Approximately 40 percent of Russia's foreign currency reserves, again the third largest in the world, are nominated in the single European currency.

## The objective ...

As Russia and the EU weather the storms of a global downturn, elaborate modernization agendas and work in parallel to ensure political, economic and social cohesion, areas of distinct interest overlap are clearly emerging. That is precisely the thinking behind the strategic objective put forward by President Putin earlier this year of advancing towards "a single market from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean with a total volume of trillions of euros". At the dawn of what has been dubbed "the Asia-Pacific century" the alternative between completing the pan-European project of a continent free of dividing lines from Lisbon to Vladivostok, or facing dwindling political and economic relevance has never been clearer.

Making the right choice involves, above all, jointly searching for interfaces for linking the massive comparative advantages Russia and the EU can offer each other in terms of mineral and energy resources and infrastructure, innovative technologies, investments and Eurasian transport routes. Above all, we should do our utmost to tap into the superior quality of human capital, that has for centuries been a hallmark of Europe, of which Russia is undoubtedly a part.

## ... And how to get there

Progress on visa liberalization and the expeditious conclusion of a Russia-EU visa waiver agreement on short-term travel would immediately translate into tangible economic benefits for both sides, while accelerating the modernizing two-way flow of ideas, culture and best practices. Updating the Russia-EU legal framework, presently embodied by a largely obsolete 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, remains essen-

tial to instilling our relationship with a robust and forward-looking agenda. Our Partnership for Modernization initiative already serves as a valid platform for harmonizing technical and environmental standards. It can bring sustained mutual benefit, keeping our social infrastructure, scientific capabilities, educational and medical systems on the global cutting edge. Finally, as regional integration efforts unfold across the post-Soviet space, we should explore ways of forging institutional links between the European Commission and the newly established Eurasian Economic Commission with a view to creating a mutually reinforcing trade potential.

Staying ambitious is our only option. Consigning relations to idle drift would allow centrifugal elements to gain traction, thus elevating risks of stalling on pressing issues and backpedalling on the time-honoured heritage of Russia-EU cooperation. What we should avoid is a disheartening build-up of cases of artificial linkages between detached portfolios, blatantly politicized treatment of selective human rights files, as well as attempts to exploit relations for short-term financial gains.

## Benefits from long-term energy cooperation

The latter applies in particular to the energy sector, where Russia has for decades been a trusted partner in satisfying EU member countries' growing oil and gas needs. The EU Third Energy Package, the projected Transcaspian gas pipeline as well as the recent decision by the EU Commission to open

---

### Vladimir Chizhov

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary  
Born Dec. 3, 1953. Graduated with honours from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, 1976. Joined diplomatic service in the same year. 1995 Deputy Head, Russian Delegation to the OSCE, 1996 Deputy High Representative for Bosnia Peace Implementation, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina; 1997 Director, 3rd European Dept., MFA, Moscow; 1999 Director, European Multilateral Cooperation Dept., MFA, Moscow; 2002 Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Moscow; 2005 Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Communities, Brussels. He has conducted analytical research work on European security, OSCE, Russia-EU and Russia-NATO relations, Mediterranean, Balkans, problems of Cyprus and Northern Ireland and UN peacekeeping. Russian Special Representative for Cyprus (1997–2000), for the Balkans (2000–2002).

---





Press-conference following the Russia-EU summit held on 3-4 June 2012 in St. Petersburg, Russia. Left to right: Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, and José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission.

Photo: press service of the Executive office of the President of the Russian Federation, Moscow

antitrust proceedings against Gazprom, while being separate cases with a specific background, have one commonality. They could adversely affect conditions for Russian involvement in EU energy markets, thereby impacting on EU long-term energy security amidst volatile global conditions and ultimately jeopardizing the interests of European consumers. In the case of the Transcaspian gas pipeline hasty EU action could also entail a lasting environmental hazard to the fauna and flora of the Caspian sea basin and coastal regions.

Problematic issues like these should be resolved in a sensible and pragmatic manner, reflecting the strategic nature of the Russia-EU partnership and our economic interdependence. More importantly, the centrality of our relationship's economic pillar must be reaffirmed through real-time trade and investment as well as by setting far-sighted policy goals while respecting the delicate fabric of agreements in force.

### The security agenda

As two neighbours, adjoining a regional arc of volatility fraught with transnational threats and challenges, Russia and the EU stand to gain from forging closer ties in the area of security. True, we can take pride in successfully thwarting pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa through joint navy patrols, collaborating in key international negotiating formats on Iran, the Middle East or Transdniestria, as well as regularly consulting on foreign policy issues at almost every level of seniority and expertise. Nevertheless, this impressive record of cooperation is still a long way from exhausting its vast potential. The amplified post-Lisbon setup of EU CFSP has yet to be matched by commensurate advances in the number and scope of concerted crisis management ventures, joint foreign policy actions and statements.

That is why Russia is pushing for a proactive security agenda with the EU. Above all, our crisis management efforts should be underpinned by a solid conceptual and legal setting elabo-

rated in the spirit of equality. This will cut "red tape" and enable a rapid Russia-EU response to an emerging crisis. In 2007-2009 the time ratio between the actual deployment of Russian forces to an EU-led Mission in Chad/Central African Republic and overcoming inherent decision-making and legal hurdles was around 1:8. If we are serious about containing regional instability together, those numbers need at the very least to be reversed.

Despite having established a productive framework for military-to-military contacts in 2010, Russia-EU defense-industrial cooperation is still fledgling. Yet in such vital areas as helicopter construction and maintenance, strategic airlift and maritime surveillance Russia stands ready to provide reliable and economical solutions to EU shortfalls.

### Achieving genuine partnership

Upgrading our "modus operandi" in foreign and security policy will ultimately require a platform for joint decision-making, strategic guidance and comprehensive political control of crisis management efforts. The Meseberg initiative, proposed by Germany in 2010 and supported by Russia, should serve as a valuable blueprint and deserves to be seized in a decisive manner without linkages to narrower regional issues.

Last but not least, achieving genuine strategic partnership implies shifting mental perspective. Our "Common Neighbourhood" in EU terms needs to be viewed as such, not as an arena for a "friend or foe" stigmatization and zero-sum stratagems.

To succeed globally Russia and the EU must steer closely alongside each other while executing a concerted turn towards economic, social and technological modernization as well as a coherent response to regional security challenges. If bearings are misaligned both sides could end up drifting away from each other, or risking collision. The upcoming Russia-EU summit in Brussels in December presents a golden "window of opportunity" to plot our course into the future.

Indispensable: shared fundamental values

## Objectives of the EU's Russia policy

by Hannes Swoboda MEP, President of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the EP, Rapporteur on a new EU-Russia agreement, Strasbourg/Brussels

In its December 2012 plenary session, the European Parliament will vote on the recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) on the negotiations for the new EU-Russia agreement. The recommendation was adopted in the foreign affairs committee at the beginning of October with an overwhelming majority: 53 votes in favour, one against. The recommendation focuses on the ambition of a strategic partnership with Russia, as a neighbour of the EU and as an important global and regional player. However, this kind of partnership can only be achieved on the basis of shared fundamental values such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for the principles of the UN Charter and international law.

Unfortunately, in recent months Russia has been moving away from these values, for example, in adopting new laws that significantly hamper the work of independent NGOs and limit freedom of expression. As a member of the UN Security Council, Russia also has to fulfil its global obligations in upholding the principles of international law and peaceful resolution of conflicts. In this context, the EU looks to Russia to show a more constructive attitude to the ongoing crisis in Syria and unsolved conflicts in Georgia. Bearing in mind these differences of approach, even more effort is needed to forge a real partnership between European and Russian societies.

### Shaping the EU's new Russia policy

Writing the report on the new EU-Russia agreement – the so-called 'Russia report' – it was very important to cooperate openly and honestly with counterparts in the other political

groups in the European Parliament. At the same time it was – and still is – vital to include the views of people on the spot. The report's development benefited from a visit to Moscow and numerous meetings with representatives from Russian politics, civil society and administration, as well as election observers in Russia and Brussels.

After researching, debating and collecting information – what are the objectives of the new EU-Russia agreement? The main objective has to be to ensure the new agreement provides a comprehensive, forward-looking and legally binding framework for the further development of relations with Russia in future years. It must take into account the need to step up cooperation in all areas in which EU and Russian interests are likely to coincide, while promoting European interests and values in areas where interests diverge, as well as supporting the democratisation and modernisation of the country.

### Political dialogue and cooperation


It is important to closely monitor Russia's internal evolution, to work together with all major political protagonists, support Russian institution-building and the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. To do so we must actively support social initiatives seeking to build a civil society based on democratic principles and the rule of law.

One of the most important objectives must be to strengthen EU-Russia dialogue on human rights so that it becomes an effective and result-oriented tool for advancing human rights in Russia. The EU should express its concern at the deteriorating situation for civil society in Russia, in particular the recent adoption of laws on demonstrations, NGOs, defamation and the regulation of the internet which contain ambiguous provisions and could expose citizens to arbitrary enforcement.

I would like to stress that the repeated attempts at regional and federal levels to curtail human rights – notably on freedom of expression and assembly, sexual orientation and gender identity – run counter to Russia's commitments under its constitution, the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Furthermore, it is important to promote the strategic partnership between the EU and Russia in meeting global challenges such as non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, peaceful resolution of protracted or new conflicts through the principles of the UN Charter and existing international law, security of energy supply, management of the Arctic dimension, climate change and poverty reduction.

### Hannes Swoboda MEP

Hannes Swoboda MEP was elected as President of the S&D group in the European Parliament in 2012. He was born in 1946 and studied law and economics at the University of Vienna. As a member of the Social Democratic Party in Austria (SPÖ) he joined the European Parliament right after Austria's accession to the EU and was the leading SPÖ candidate in the following elections (2004, 2009). He has served on 15 committees, 11 delegations and has been the Rapporteur for countless reports with a regional focus on south-east Europe, central Asia and Russia. Having served as a vice-president of the S&D, his law and economics background, the 14 years representing the interest of employees in the Vienna chamber of labour as well as the nine years he served in the Vienna Assembly and Municipal Council provided him with vast prior experience and knowledge of foreign affairs, urban development, education, health, housing and labour policies.



Hannes Swoboda MEP, President of the Socialists and Democrats Group in the European Parliament

Photo: ©S&amp;D Group European Parliament

### Economic dependence as the mainspring

When it comes to economic aspects of EU-Russia cooperation, the growing economic cooperation between EU and Russia, as reciprocal import markets and suppliers of goods, services and energy, has to be taken into account. The EU is one of Russia's strategic trade partners, ranking as its first source of imports, its main export destination and a key investment partner. At the same time, Russia has become the EU's second source of imports (with a value of € 158.6 billion) and its fourth destination for exports (€ 86.1 billion). The report therefore welcomes Russia's membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and underlines how it can facilitate trade flows between the

EU and Russia, while stimulating economic growth and job creation on both sides. We must support Russia's willingness to use WTO membership as a driver for structural reforms and encourage Russia's bid for membership of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development). Concluding the ideas on the EU's objectives towards Russia, I believe that – despite some deep and growing divergences with the Russian leadership on fundamental values and key foreign policy issues – the way forward is not through Cold War-style confrontational rhetoric but through dialogue and pragmatic cooperation on issues of common interest.

### News: Catherine Ashton's statement on Russia

"(...) The EU has been encouraging newly-elected President Putin to pursue the political and economic reforms started by President Medvedev. We also offered our support in working on our shared modernisation agenda. (...) There had been some encouraging initial steps in Spring to further develop Russia's democratic institutions, notably the easing of party registration rules and requirements for presidential candidates as well as direct elections of regional governors. (...)

Since May, however, we have been seeing less and less dialogue and openness on the side of the authorities, and rather more intolerance of any expression of dissenting views. Instead of stronger safeguards for the

exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms, we have seen a string of measures all chipping away at them (...)

This trend raises serious questions as to the state of the rule of law in the country, in particular the use of legal and law enforcement structures and other instruments for political purposes rather than for protecting and safeguarding the rights and freedoms of the citizens of Russia. (...)

We remain ready to support Russia in all its positive reform efforts, working closely together in our Partnership for Modernisation, the full integration into the international rules-based system, and the development of citizens' rights and freedoms which must be the basis for stability and prosperity. But we

should not shy away from our responsibilities as a strategic partner, who is also tied by common international obligations and responsibilities, to express our concerns with recent developments. The recent set of steps taken by the government sets the country on the wrong path, and wastes the opportunity for effective modernisation and democratic development provided by the political awakening of Russia's new middle classes."

*Statement in the European Parliament on the political use of justice in Russia, Strasbourg, 11 September 2012*

Source: European Parliament

Protection for Europe – and Russian suspicion

# The NATO-Russia Council and the Missile Defence project

by Dr Klaus Olshausen, Lt.Gen. (ret.), President, Clausewitz-Gesellschaft, Hamburg

In early May this year the international media were buzzing with reports of the violent condemnation by Russian Defence Chief General Nicolai Makarov, pronounced during a conference in Moscow, of NATO's plan to achieve an interim missile defence (MD) capability by its Chicago summit. Makarov even suggested pre-emptive attacks against missile installations in allied countries as a potential Russian response.

Only days later did some of the media take note of remarks made at the same conference by NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow explaining in great detail why NATO's MD project, aimed at providing comprehensive protection of allied territories and populations against present and future threats, was a responsible step forward.

Those statements highlight the fact that the combination of NATO, Russia and missile defence brings with it opportunities but also the risk of severe friction or even failure.

## A historical snapshot

The development of North Korea's nuclear weapons programme and the 9/11 terror attacks prompting a focus on the wider Middle East were critical factors in the Bush administration's decision to denounce the Antibalistic Missile Treaty (ABM) Treaty dating back to the early 1970s. The requirement for a limited defence capability against future long-range ballistic missiles from those countries/regions made this step unavoidable, according to the US rationale. Moreover, notwithstanding all the criticism on the part of the international community and Russia, the then Russian President Putin coolly claimed that Russian offensive capabilities would in any case easily be able to overwhelm those defences.

## Creation of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC)

Three years following the controversy over the decision to launch the Kosovo air campaign, the 9/11 terrorist attacks prompted increased interest on the part of both Russia and NATO in seeking ways of coming closer with a view to combating transnational terrorism. At that time NATO had also embarked on the final stages of its decision-making process on the accession of seven new members, including the three Baltic States. The creation of the NRC was therefore also perceived as a means of mitigating the repercussions for Russia of former USSR member states joining NATO. It is worth mentioning in this context that the Rome Declaration of 28 May 2002, besides general military-to-military



## Dr Klaus Olshausen

Dr Klaus Olshausen was born in Eisenberg on April 25, 1945. On graduation from high school he joined the Bundeswehr. 1967-1972 studies of history and political sciences and PhD at the Albert-Ludwigs-University, Freiburg. 1978 completion of general staff officer training. 1979-1985 G2 12th (GE) Armoured Division; attendee of the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, KS, USA and Foreign and security policy directorate at the Federal Chancellery, Bonn and Commander of Engineer Battalion 2. 1985: Planning Staff of MoD. 1987 Military Attaché in Washington, DC, USA. 1990 Commander (GE) Infantry Brigade 31. 1994 as a Brigadier General Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff Army Support Command. 1996 Deputy Commanding General EUROCORPS in Strasbourg. 1998 Deputy Commander HQ IV. Corps (Deputy Commander GE KFOR (KOSO-VO). 2000-2006 German Military Representative to the MC/NATO, WEU and EU on 1 October 2000 with the rank of Lieutenant General.

cooperation, already included Theatre Missile Defence as one of the nine areas in which cooperative efforts were to be taken forward.

## Missile defence as a NATO project

But before delving deeper into the topic of missile defence it is helpful to establish the perspective and intentions on both sides that led to the creation of the NRC. While NATO nations were eager to engage with Russia, at least to a certain extent, but without (Russian-imposed) constraints, Russia was seeking to create a forum of equal partners in order to take decisions on significant European security issues. "Both sides want to lead but not be led".

From SDI to the Rumsfeld report of 1998, from the Bush administration's National Missile Defense Project (including cooperation with Poland and the Czech Republic) to the "phased approach" of the Obama administration, missile defence was and remains a critical US project. It was only with Obama's adaptation of the programme and his readiness to enlarge its scope to cover the whole of NATO Europe that the Allies rallied behind the programme, with the additional prospect of broad transparency vis-à-vis Russia and deliberate coordination or even the broadest possible cooperation with it. Although the then President Medvedev agreed at the 2010 Lisbon summit to such cooperation in general, Russia had